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~i. NICHOLAS GOLO~ SP ACE SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY - THE NEAR AND DISTANT FUTURE 
It is a pleasure to be here today, and take part in your Fall 
Conference on the Nation's Space and Space Science Programs . I have 
discovered a number of former associates in the Canaveral Council of 
Technical Societies, and there is no better way to resume old friendships 
than by joining in discussion of a problem of common interest . The 
purpose of your Conference -- "to stimulate se.rious thought and definitive 
planning on the .part of government, business and institutions, and a 
gen~ral . awareness on the part of the public ..• " in the challenges 
posed by .. what you call the "Pace of the Race to Space" -- is indeed such 
a problem. 
Although the focus of your meeting is on the difficulties and 
opportunities facing the State of Florida and the Cape Area particularly, 
my assignment from your Executive :Board Chainnan -- Jim Duffett -- is 
somewhat broader. As I understand it, my function is to help to supply 
a long-range, national rather than regional, technical content for detailed 
review of more locally oriented issues . What I have to say is based on 
this understanding, and explains the somewhat sweeping .title for these 
remarks -- "Space Science and Technology, the Near and Distant Future." 
One additional introductory remark before getting down t o businessJ 
I am taking at face value your declared interest in "serious thought and 
definitive planning. " Thus, I assume that we are here today not as 
"cheerleaders" for bigger and more profitable space spectaculars each 
fiscal year, but as participants in a genuine effort to be rational in 
making more or less educated guesses about what .is likely to be in store 
for us because of the "Race to Space." 
What do ·I mean by the "near" and by the "distant" future? Events 
occurring roughly within the time period needed to attain a successf'ul 
manned round trip to the mpon fall within the "near fu~ure" , the "distant 
future" is a · somewhat more ccmplex notion. I choose to look at it as 
being its~lf divided into two periods : , the end of the first being marked_ 
in time approximately by a successful manned round trip to Mars, and the 
second as including events following that accomplishment. To pin these 
notions down to the calendar: the lunar round trip is plw:µied within the 
remainder of the decade, so the "near future" is roughly in .1970; it is 
· conceivable that the Martian round trip can be acccmplished in the fi~een 
to twenty years following, that is, perhaps by 1985 to 1990. Many of us 
:here today should be able to participate technically in this adventure; 
almost certainly, all of us will participate econcmically by helping to 
pay for it . The ensuing period is really the "distant future." I propose 
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to speculate with you about each of these three periods in sane detail, 
basing my discussion largely on technical considerations. Accordingly, 
·my remarks will reflect judgments as to what is likely 'to come out of 
either American or non-American space technology, without trying to 
guess as to what will be done by whom first. If what I ~ay will be dot!~------­
doesn 't agree with your understanding of the content of our national 
program, please don't interpret the remark as a recommendation for a 
change in the program; it will not be that at all. What follows is purely 
my personal guess as to how world technology in this field is likely to 
move ahead, and what some of the implications of such progress ·may turn 
out to be. 
Although the progression of major technical accomplishments leading 
to manned exploration on the moon obviously cannot yet be completely 
defined, enough experience is available to block out a general outline. 
Having acquired the ability to make at will successful manned round trips 
to earth orbit, subsequent developments might go like this. 
First. Placing men and equipment in earth orbit for prolonged periods, 
using either general mission spacecraft or especially designed laboratories 
of size and weight allowed·by the then available booster capabilities and 
state-of-the-art in rendezvous technology. 
The first manned lunar round trip will involve at lea·st seven days, and 
the effects on the health and capabilities of the crew under realistically 
simulated space conditions will need to be first studied over substantially 
longer periods. Similarly, the effects ol' the space environm.ent on can-
ponents playing central roles in system reliability will need to be proved 
out by testing in space for periods several times the length of mission 
duration requirements. It is possible, of course, that unusually rapid 
growth.of confidence in the expected reliability of the systems to be 
used. may make the development of orbital techniques for such purposes an 
objective following rather than preceding initial attempts for a successful 
manned lunar round trip. 
Second. Unmanned observation of the moon from low lunar orbits, 
and earth recovery 01' instrumentation. 
A leisurely approach to the moon mission would include earth recovery 
from lunar orbit of animals and observational equipment launched in a 
prototype of the capsule to be used for the first manned mission. Such 
experiments would provide full duration, realistic testing of the environ-
mental control, guidance, earth re-entry, and landing subsystems without 
requi~ing commitment of crews. However, such experiments would be possi-
ble, and would be attempted, only if the developmental philosophy for 
the manned lunar landing mission included complete mechnnization of all 
required control operations, and employed the crew for observations, 
and as a redundant resource to be used only if autcmatic equipment mal-
functioned. Whether, and when, such a philosophy will be a reasonable 
one to adopt, even for particular phases of the over-all mission, is one 








Third. Manned circumnavigation of the moon followed by repeated 
orbital flights around the moon prior to earth return. 
Since the interva1 fran beginning of fina1 descent to the ·1unar surface 
to lunar take-off for earth return, will involve t!!-:' greatest system com-
plexities and risks in· the final mission, such experiments can probably be 
carried out substantially earlier than manned landings. Because these 
exercises will be spectacular in themselves; can be used, for example, to 
provide man-supervised, high-resolution, photography of the lunar surface 
for improved engineering of landing techniques and guidance procedures; and 
because they will test crews Jointly with much of over-all systems equipment, 
without subjecting them to the maximum risks of the mission, it is most 
likely that they will. be undertaken. 
Fourth. Development of a comprehensive and detailed operational 
plan for lunar exploration. 
It is very likely that detailed photographic and radiation instrumenta-
tion coverage of most of the lunar surface will have been obtained prior 
to the manned landing attempt. In view of the great incentive provided by 
recognition of priority in discovery, and because extensive manned explora-
tion of the lunar surface will be both extremely hazardous and costly, a 
great deal of analytical scientific effort, based on the then available 
data, is likely to be invested in optimum plans for locating instrumentation 
on the lunar surface, obtaining samples of surface material, making borings 
or seismic measurements, and so on. The principal objective of a large-
scale effort along these lines will be to insure that most of what it 
is desirable to·learn in detail about the moon can be learned quickly, 
at low cost, and with minimum need for human presence on the lunar surface. 
Also, it seems certain that development of equipment providing for automated 
data· acquisition, processing and transmission in unmanned lunar exploration 
procedures, will be one of the principal technological challenges of the 
years inunediately following the successful manned lunar landing. In spite 
of all the exciting, romantic connotations of the words "moon" and 
"exploration," it is likely that the logic of high hazards and costs will 
canpel severe limitation of human participation in lunar exploration, once 
the drama of the first manned landing is behind us. 
Fifth. Establishment of an eventually urunanned lunar base, principally 
for astronomical observations. 
A great deal of speculative discussion has appeared about the early 
establishment of manned lunar bases, particularly for military purposes, 
once we have learned how to carry out safe manned round trips to the moon. 
I~ MB\Y' be worthwhile to suggest in passing why much of such speculation 
MB\Y' be somewhat unrealistic. The Apollo mission can be accomplished with 
a ratio of total launch weight to lunar landing weight of about 120 to l, 
and to earth return landing weight of about 6oo to 1. Past experience 
suggests that the launch cost ·of each complete system for a round-trip 
flight is not likely to be significantly less than about $10 per pound 
at launch. Assuming t'hat 10~ of the Apollo• s weight can be used for 
payloads on the return leg of the trip, it will then cost some $1,200 per 
pound to deliver supplies fron earth to the moon, and some $60,000 per 
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pound to bring materials from the moon to eerth. With such exchange 
ratios to cope with, it is difficult to see et this time vhat economic 
or other purely practical motivations will justify large scale, continuing 
manned luner travel once the initial goal of the project is attained. The 
concept of e luner beee for purely scientific purposes, end·one not neces-
sarily requiring human participation in operating it, is accordingly about 
the only one thet mekee sense et thie time. The most probable fl.Ulction 
of such e base vould be to house en eetronomicel observatory, with facili-
ties for fully automatic date ecquiaition, processing and transmission to 
eerth. Even then, it is not nov obvious that equivalent scientific re8ulte, 
et relatively much lower costs, could not be obtained from earth-orbiting 
astronomical observatories, especially after aeversl generations of evo-
lution in systems development. 
These few charecteriatic8 of technological developments which may 
dominate the remainder of this decade vill probably make much heavier 
demands on the human and materiel resources available to us or to our 
competitors than is commonly assumed. Thus, it is difficult to essess 
objectively and reliably, at this time, the scale of the effort ultimately 
- .~ be absorbed by the menned lunar landing program, either in terms of 
·rained manpower or of other needs since many technical uncertainties still 
remain whose effect on program costs end schedule time is impossible to 
assess without more experiebce. Also, we are still too early in the devel-
opmental stages of most of the hardwere to be used for manned space flight 
to guess with reasonable confidence hov much ayatem testing and time vill 
be needed for the discovery and correction of developmental errors we must 
assume will be made. In addition, there ere somewhat leas obvious limita-
tions to the scale to which our over-ell apace 'effort can be built up and 
which we cannot ignore in attempting to establish realistic bases for plan-
ning in various contexts. For example, in e study submitted to the House 
Committee on Science end Astronautics (authorship not specified in the 
published record) et the time of its hearings on NASA's 1963 appropriations 
authorization, it is predicted that total U.S. research end development 
expenditures for space, beginning with $2.5 billion for 1962, vill be {in 
billions) as follows: $6.2 in 1964; $9.3 in 1966; $11.7 in 1968; and $13.0 
in 1970. To check if these estimates are realizable, let's look at just 
one aspect of the assumed rate of growth--the effect on the utilization 
of scientists and engineers available in the United States during this period. 
First, it hes been reliably estimeted that in 1962 at least one-third 
of American scientists engaged in research and development are concerned 
with the science and technology of space. Also, ve know that the total 
pool of available technical manpower in the U.S. is growing et a rate of 
about 6% per year. A simple calculation then shows that if the total 
space research and development budget were to grow by a factor of somewhat 
more then 5 betwe~n now end 1970, as is predicted by the study referred to, 
end, if the space program's utilization of technical manpower per budget 
dollar did not change too redicelly during thie period, and there is no 
particular reason to believe that it would, then, the space program would 




for research and development· in the u.s . 
The principal point of this example is it shows that limits exist both 
to the rate of annual growth of the space program, and to.the absolute 
level of effort that it is _probably practical for it to reach, no matter 
how enthusiastic~lly willing we might .be to push the "Pace of the Race to 
Space·." 
Furthermore, let us recall that the main reason for the national 
importance of the space program is to help demonstrate to the world at 
large the dominating .role our society plays in science and technology. 
But we have been internationally challenged in fields other than space--
for example, in our industrial efficiency as reflected in the ability of 
our goods to compete in world markets, or by the rate of growth in our 
per capita and over-all industrial productivity. Clear4', these challenges 
are no .less vital, even if less visible, than primacy in space. But to meet 
them also, we must increase substantially the level of our research and ______ · 
development effort in industry generally, and therefore the incentives for--
able scientists and engineers to enter such work. Only by doing so will 
we be able to ensure that other sectors of our economy mak.e their needed 
contributions to the vitality of our total technological strength. 
Let us now turn, somewhat more briefly, to the likely problems and 
technical developments of interest in the next major period in space tech-
nology- - manned landings on, and exploration of, the planets. 
First, technically, the most significant difference between the plane-
tary and lunar missions will be in the time taken for the round trip, and 
in engineering out the complications that this longer mission time in space 
will induce from a reliability point of view. 
The duration of a planetary round trip will be several tens of times 
that of a lunar trip, of the order of' one year or so in length. In compari-
son to the lunar mission, it will therefore require proportionate increases 
in the mean time to failure of all equipments employed. Also, the dangers 
of meteoroid damage, and of excessive radiation dosage to the crew, will 
increase proportionately to mission time. Since neither of these risks haG 
yet been explored quantitatively with any thoroughness, little can now be 
said about the weight of shielding required to insure crew survival from 
either danger. .Furthennore, exposure for a year to the confinement and 
stresses of a space journey will also no doubt require that the ere~ be 
provided with elbow room and supporting facilities on a scale substantially 
more generous than is currently assumed adequate :for the week to 10 days 
occupancy of the Apollo capsule during the lunar trip. Combining in a 
general wa:y the weight requirements for equipment redundancy to insure 
reliability, for needed meteoroid and radiation shielding, and for crew 
facilities and supplies for a year's journey, let's assume that the weight 
in earth .orbit of a Martian Apollo 3-man system, on its return from a 
Martian circumnavigation trip, ·will be some 10 times that of the lunar 
Apollo system--say, 120,000 pounds. This number in hand, we can estimate 
the vehicle weights required at launch from earth, and on light-o:ff from 
earth-orbit, for alternative types of propulsion systems which might be 
available for such a journey: (1) for an all-chemical system we will need 
about 8 million pounds of vehicle ·weight in earth orbit, and about 200 millio11 
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pounds at launch on earth; (2) for a chemical propulsion $ystem in the first 
stage, and nuclear systems for the remaining stages, we will need about 1-1/2 
million pounds in earth orbit, and about 45 million pounds on take-off fran 
earth. 
The launch weight of a Saturn·C-5 rocket, together with its PS\Y'lOad for 
the lunar round trip, will be about 6 million pounds. The Martian manned 
circumnavigation problem-- and this is less demanding than a manned Martian 
landing--if it is executed with all-chemical systems, will then require the 
equivalent of 34 C-5 rockets per trip; if such a journey is executed with 
nuclear-powered upper stages, the earth take-off .requirement will be the 
weight equivalent of some 9 C-5 rockets per trip. 
Although this is scmetimes asstuned, it is not necessarily likely that 
the cost of propulsion and payload systems for planetary exploration ~ill 
be less per pound of weight at take-off than for those used for lunar 
exploration. However, let us nevertheless assume that the cost per pound 
launched for planetary trips will only be half as great as for lunar ones--
even so,·at least one-qua~er of a billion dollars per Martian circumnavi-
gation trip will be required. Evidently, such journeys are not likely to 
be undertaken lightly or'too often. 
In addition; the foregoing discussion suggests that the choice of 
propulsion systems, and of operational methods, to be developed for planetary 
exploration will necessarily be a major problem of concern during the latter. 
years of this decade. In view of the magnitude ol: the developmental problems 
to be faced in planetary exploration, its cost·in technical manpower and in 
natural resources will need to be estimated and scheduled in advance·with 
more than usual care; its execution will call Tor levels of detail and compre-
hensiveness in planning and in coordination, at both the national and 
industrial levels, without peacetime precedent; new techniques for organiza-
tion and management of the effort wi.Ll probably need to be invented. 
Second, the incentives for aut.omated L1strumentatlo!.i systems to observe 
and explore planetary environments aud surl'aces will clearly be even gre.ater 
than for the lunar exploration prob.Lem. 
Since, in fact, little can be done by men in routine observation ant.. 
measurement which cannot be better ea.rried ou·c by instruments, and because 
of the extra?rdinary costs ~d haz&.rds.in.transporting equipments as fragile 
as men over 1nterplanetary distances, .Lt is highly probable that manned 
planetary journeys, OAce the large gains from the first few successful row1d 
trips are behind us, will be substantially rarer even than lunar ones. It is 
extremely unlikely that the frequency will soon approach the one per week 50 ~requently estimated in aerospace contractors' brochures. 
In this connection, it is also important to keep in mind that lunar a.&~u 
planetary exploration cannot now, or for the foreseeable future, be justifiea 
on economic grounds. No commercially valuable materials ·now known and likely 
to be found or "produced" els~where in the solar system, can concefvably have 
a cost-per-pound on earth after a lunar or planetary trip which will be less 
than the cost-per-pound for the production of their equivalents on earth. The 
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only available justifications for these programs are the advancement they 
contribute to scientific knowledge and the contributions they make to 
national prestige. However, the scientific problems whose probability 
of solution would seem to be appreciably enhanced by lunar and planetary 
exploration are those related to the origin and evolution of the solar 
system, and to the origin and evolution of life in it. To what degree 
manned Journeys to various parts of the solar system will be needed to 
advance scientific understanding of these problems is, however, still an 
open question. But, as suggested previously, en.onnous incentives, because 
of the high costs and high hazards, will exist to devise instrumentation, 
and design experiments, which will provide needed data from the lunar and 
planetary environments with minimal physical involvement of men in space 
travel. It then follows that one of the principal economically useful 
"spill-overs" of the "race to space" might be acceleration in the develop-
ment of automated instrumentation systems and tec~iques for use on earth. 
Paradoxically, thus, the primary motivations leading to such developments 
will be the economies to be realized by keeping men out of space! 
I now want to spen4 a little time speculating about the "distant 
future" of the program. · In some industrial reports I have seen, this 
period is referred to as the period of "Universe .Exploration" and it is 
assumed to begin about 1990, the year by which the technology of controlled 
thennonuclear reactions is assumed by some to have been mastered for use 
on earth, as well as successfully applied to the somewhat more denanding 
constraints of rocket engineering. 
I can think of no better way to discuss ideas about manned space 
travel outside the solar system than to introduce the elegant and enter-
taining analysis made by Purcell in his Brook.haven Lecture. This lecture 
should be required reading for all budding space enthusiasts. 'rhe point 
of bis argument, for our purposes·, can be restated in the following way: 
First, the principal argument in favor of manned travel outside the 
solar system is to find and explore other planetary systems having environ-
mental conditions not incompatible with life; 
Second, a scientific analysis using all of the available astronomical 
evidence, direct and indirect, suggests that there i.s a high probability 
of finding planetary systems, with general environmental conditions approach-
ing those on earth, within the distances of about 12 light years from earth; 
Third, assume that we have a i'usio11 reactor coverting hydrogen to 
helium with perfect efficiency, and that we have mastered the technology 
of expelling the helium from the vehiclE: in one direction wl th the maximum 
velocity allowed by th~ Energy release of the reactioi1; then, using a 
"round-trip time minimizing 1' trajectory on which we accelerate t.o a maximum 
velocity of 99fo. that of light, we could make a round trip to a planetary 
system 12 light years away in 28 earth years, during which the astronauts 
would have aged only some 10 years; 
I 
Fourth, we could have used a lower maximum velocity, but theJ the 
trip would have taken longer; or we could have accelerated to a higher 
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speed"but then the launch problem would have become even more difficult, 
since: 
Fifth, using a theoretically perfect rocket design, the above 
journex would require a ratio of the initial to the final payload mass of 
4 x 10j6. · Assuming that the capsule system carryi~ the intrepid astronauts 
~eighs 10 tons on arriving back on earth, it then readily follows that the 
take-off mass of the rocket would need to be 20 billion times the weight 
of the sun! A substantial launch problem, even at Canaveral! 
Of course, the real space enthusiast will not be deterred by this 
line of argument. He will say, we should use a rocket burning matter with 
"anti-matter." Purcell, too, thought of this argument. He redid the calcu-
lation with this "fuel" and found that the initial to final mass ratio does 
indeed become much more reasonable, only 4o,ooo or so, so that the initial 
weight of the rocket will need to be "only"4oo,ooo tons-- that is 200,000 
tons of matter and 200 ,000 tons of "anti-matter" --no mean trick for the 
advanced technology of the 1990's, even disregarding radiation shielding 
problems which Purcell indicates will be substantially greater for the earth 
than for the crew! It turns out that this "high enerSY fueled" rocltet will 
radiate, for sometime after take-off, more energy than the earth receives 
from the Sun, but all thisQradiation would unfortunately be gamma rays 
rather than Florida sunshine! 
It will be sometime before J.'ederal fiscal officers begin issuinc 
RFP' s to procure "nonmaterial" bottles ·to hold the "anti-matter" for such 
"second generation" fusion powered rockets. 
One of the most reliable assertions one can make about the fm,ure 
of the space program in general is that our industry nL'(.:d Hot concera its1:· ~f, 
for sometime to come, with the problems or building vehicles for manned 
exploration of other solar systems. For the time being, and without endati6cr-
ing our international prcst.i.~e, we can sai'ely leave such bola a.nd venture~J .. ;e 
undertakings to other cow1tries. Whatever exploration of the Uui verse 
beyond the solar system will be eventually undertaken, even in the distan7.. 
future, it will almost cc·rtainly conslst, us Purcell also suggests, o!' 
building bigger and uetter radio te.i..~:scopcLl nere, on earth--for the prospect 
of eventually discovering radio evid~nce Ot' greater intelligence and know-
ledge elsewhere. 'rhcre wo~1ld be lit.t le point in building telescopes for 
this purpose on the moon, and no~ on or.her planets, since our atmosphere 
has a radio window of com1'ortable width, which any culture in~erested in 
transmitting inl'unnation over the interstellar distances would surely know 
is available. 
In conclusion, let me now make just the following points: 
First, insofar as the inunediate .i.'uture is concern.ed, the space progrB.i:-; 
is likely to pick up some additional momentum, and probably absorb still 
more of our technical manpower pool as well as of other resources .. 
Canaveral, and Florida in g~neral, will necessarily acquire heavier work-
loads attributable directly to expansion i~ this program. 





will necessarily level off, not because of diminished enthusiasm, or of 
shortages in funds, or lack of national resources in general, but simply 
because the nation has other pressing tasks for its scientists and engineers 
which are likely to become even more urgent as time goes.on. In view of 
the high proportion of trained men already committed to this program, the 
time of this leveling off may not be too far ahead. 
Third, eventually, in view of the inevitably high costs and hazards 
of manned space travel, incentives for automation of lunar and planetary 
exploration will become very great. It is perhaps in this area that the 
space program will, in time, produce the most important "spill-over" 
benefits to the national economy in general. It wvuld seem that, at the 
corporate level of planning, for exmaple, the development of competence 
in the scientific disciplines and techniques relevant to such work would 
be the soundest approach to important long-run participation in the space 
program, as well as in the general industrial progress it will tend to 
stimulate. 
Fourth, it begins to become clear that a problem of transcendent 
importance in long-range planning l'or our economy as a whole--that is, 
not only for the central national government, but for industry and local 
government as well~s that of how to insure that increasingly greater 
proportions of our ablest youth are motivated'to undertake, a.rrl to survive, 
the rigQrs of training needed to enter professional fields in science and 
technology, and then are provided the incentives to remain in such work. 
There appears available no route other than this to insure that the Nation 
is able both to cope with, and to take advantage of, the rapidly accelerat-
ing growth of science and its technological consequences. 
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